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To explore the relation between political instability and central bank autonomy, this
paper develops and analyses a data base covering over 60 countries, both developing and
industrial. It uses several indices of gross political influence on the central bank, created by
relating the timing of changes in the bank's governor to the timing of political transitions.
Political influence is the rule rather than the exception. In periods shortly after
political transitions, up to about six months according to tests reported in the paper, the
governors change more frequently than at other times. This pattern appears for industrial as
well as developing countries, although the latter group has a higher average frequency of
turnover and less central bank autonomy. The degree of political influence is also revealed
by the fraction of political transitions that are followed within six months by a replacement of
the central bank governor. This indicator of central bank political vulnerability is higher for
developing countries and is especially high for those that experienced one or more changes
between democratic and authoritarian regimes.
The paper also examines how this measure of central bank vulnerability correlates
statistically with inflation and its variability, and with real growth and real interest rates.
The differences in vulnerability of the central bank to political instability, in political
instability itself, and in central bank tumover in non-political periods seem to be a major part
of the explanation for why the developing countries on average have higher and more
variable inflation than industrial countries. These variables also help explain differences in
real grow[h and in interest rates.1
I. INTRODUCTiON
Economists and policy makers generally feEl that the degree of autonomy of the central
bank (CB) from political authorities is an important determinant of policy choices and of
economic performance. Empirical verification of these presumptions has been difficult,
however, because the autonomy of the CB depends on many attributes which are not easily
quarttified. Most previous studies have useà legal indices from CB charters to quarttify the
autonomy of the CB (Pazkin (198~, Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991), Alesina and
Summers (1993)). These measures help account for cross country inflation differentials
within industrial economies but not within developing countries. The lack of associatioa
between inflation and legal CB independence in developing countries is due to the small
degree of association between actual and legal independence among those countries.' Hence
more behavioral indices of independence are called upon. Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti
(1992) and Cukietrman (1992) made an initial step in this diraction by using the ~y~
average term in office of the govemor as a proxy for central bank independence in
developing countries.~ This paper presses the inquiry further by taking account how turnover
~Within industrial couotries tóe froquency of replacement of a CB govemor in periods wóicL are within
throe months of the time 6e should have beea replaced accordiog to the law is mom than tea times higher tàaa tlu
same frequeacy in other periods. 7be same ratio in developing countries is only 2.2.
zlLey found a significant negative association behveen thisproxy aud inflatioa acr~s developingcountria.
7be use of this proxy is based oa the presumption tLat below some tlveshold a shorter term io office of the chief
executive officer of tóe liank is associated with lower CB independence. It should be noted, in thia context, ttut
actual terma in office in developing countries aro substantially lower than in industrisl countries. Culciermsa 1994
sóows theorotically how the expected leagth of teauro of the CB governor relate8 inveraely to inflation, via the
governor'a effoctive nte of tiroe prefereace.z
of the governor relates to political events.
A variety of research -- theory, case studies and statistical analysis -- shows that
political instability worsens macro-economic policy and outcomes (Edwards and Tabellini
1992; Haggard, Kaufman and Webb 1992; Haggard and Webb 1994). The effects are
strongest on inflation, but other variables such as growth and the real interest rate are also
affected. Some of this effect may come from the direct effects of political change on policy,
particularly fiscal. Some also comes from the effect on institutions, such as the cential bank,
and on their ability and incentive to follow policies for the long-run benefit of the economy.
So one of the broader questions on the research agenda concerns the relative importance of
different channels through which political instability influences economic ou[comes. Other
underlying questions are whether and how political instability affects insti[utions lilce the
central bank. It seems likely that different kinds of political instability would have quite
different effects. If political changes reflected changes in basic attitude toward economic
policy or if they were traumatic and irreversible for the politicians involved, then the
instability would motivate politicians to control the cen[ral bank tightly and keep it at their
disposal to help them stay in power. On the other hand, if the political changes were
alternations in power of two or three parties that shared a consensus on many basic tenets of
economic policy, then they might agree to grant the central bank considerable autonomy to
pursue price stability, so that aspect of economic policy, on which they agrced would not
suffer from the political contests over other issues. These questions motivated the data
collection and analysis in this paper, although it dces not provide definitive answers to all of
them.3
This paper presents new behavioral indices of gross political intluence on the central
bank. The indices focus on the propensity of the chief ezecutive officer of the bank to lose
his office following a political transition. The data base and the indices derived from it were
designed to address the following questions which are related to the broader questions set
forth in the previous paragraphs: 1. Is tumover at the CB significantly different shortly after
political transitions than in other periods? 2. What is the appropriate cutoff between
political and non-political periods? 3. Are there systematic relationships between the
political wlnerability of the CB, on the one hand, and the level of economic development
and the type of political regime on the other? 4. Are there systematic relations between the
political wlnerability of the CB and measures of economic performance such as inflation,
growth and interest rates?
1'he first question is answered by comparing the frequency of governor changes in
periods that are located shortly after a political transition with the same frequency in other
periods. We refer to these other periods as "non-political", while recognizing that even then
the tumover may result from some political influence. Nevertheless, in the presence of
heavy political influence we should ezpect the frequency of CB govemor changes to be
significantly higher in periods immediately after political transitions ("political periods") than
in non political periods. The tests presented in the paper suggest that this is indeed the case
for the entire sample of 64 countries, for the subgroup of developing countries and,
surprisingly, for the industrial economies as well. Given this result, the frequency of CB
governor changes in political periods can be used as an index of the eztent of political
influence over the CB, which leads to more refined indicators of CB autonomy.To answer the second question we divide the periods following poli[ical transitions into
a number of short intervals and calculate the frequency of changes at the CB within each
interval. These frequencies are initially high and usually decrease with the length of the lag
period. To find the cutoff between political and non-political periods we focus on the largest
lag interval for which: 1) the frequency of changes at the CB within this interval is
significantly higher than the frequency at lags of ten or more months ~i ; 2) The
frequencies in all intervals beyond this one do not significantly differ from the frequency in
the ten-or-more months interval. The demarcadon line between political and non poGtical
periods is then defined as the upper bound of the critical lag interval. With this procedure
periods within siz months of the latest political transition are defined as political in the
ovenll sample and in most subsamples, and any period beyond that is non political.
The third question is handled by calculating a measure of political wlnerability of the
CB and by ezamining its relation with a country's level of development and the nature of its
regíme (always demociatic, always authoritarian or mized). Vulnerability of the CB is
defined as the fraction of political transitions that are followed, within the subsequent
political periods, by a replacement of the CEO of the bank. It is then used on a country by
country basis in order to answer the fourth question regarding possible interactions between
CB wlnerability and economic performance.
Frequent removal from office of the bank's CEO following political transitions probably
reflects gross political intluence, since his term in otfice is not shielded by law or custom
from political changes. This type of influence is more common in developing than in
industrialized economies and, within the first group, is particularly high in countries that5
switch between democratic and authoritarian regimes. Political in8uence on the CB also
exists in countries where the indez of political vulnerability of the CB is low or zero, but it
is likely to be more subtle and, therefore, milder.'
The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the data set and discusses the
conventions used to organize it. The procedure for distinguishing between political and non
political CB governor changes is developed and applied to the full sample of countries in
section III. Section N performs the same exercise for broad subgroups of countries and
generally compares the lag profiles of estimated probabilities of change at the CB across
subgroups. An appendix to this section ranks countries by their frequencies of political CB
changes. Section V develops indices of CB political vulnerability for broad subgroups of
countries and investigates the effect of different types of political transitions on CB
vulnerability. An appendix to this section ranks individual countries by the political
vulnerability of their central banks. The effects of vulnerability and of non political tttrnover
on inflation, grnwth and real rates are briefly examined in section VI. Section VII estimates
empirically how much of the strong cross sectional association between inflation and its
variance is due to their common association with CB vulnerability and non political turnover.
II. THE DATA
To assess and quantify the degrea of political influence on the CB we have put together
a multi~ountry data set on political and on CB instability. Political instability is meast~red
3A case in point is the U.S. in which tLe index of CB vulnerabifiry is rero implying tàe mn-axiatmceof
aross poGdical influeace. But, u documentod in Havrileslcy (t992). there are saveral other. milder. cóannels of
political influeace on the CB in the U.S.by counting political transitions of various types. Instability at the CB is measured with data
on the frequency and timing of replacement of CB govemors. The research focuses on
variables that were available from a large number of countries on a uniform basis.
Political transitions: Instability of the ezecutive branch of government seems most
relevant for central bank autonomy. Consequently we selected four types of political change
as indicators of political instability: change of the head of government, change of the party
in government, change of the fundamental rules of govemment as embodied in switches from
authoritarian to democratic regimes or vice versa, and irregular changes of government from
one authoritarian ruler to another. These types of changes form a hierdrehy, so that each
political event is coded as a single type - either a change of the head of government without
change of party, a non-violent change of party without change of type of government, and an
irregular change of (authoritarian) government without change of form of govemment (a
coup), or a change of the form of government between democratic and authoritarian (a
change in regime). We refer to these as low level, middle level, type-2 authoritarian, and
high level political instability.
Our previous research indicated that the autonomy of the central bank díffered markedly
between industrial and developing countries (Cukierman, Webb,and Neyapti 1992). This
paper therefore examines whether this distinction is also important for the effects of political
instability on the central bank. Within each group, countries are further broken down into
subgroups with democratic regimes for the whole period, with authoritarian rcgimes
throughout, and with regimes that alternate between a democratic and authoritarian. We
classified as democradc only the countries and periods in which the head of government was7
chosen as a result of competitive elections. The classifications thus differ somewhat from
what one would code as the degree of political liberty, such as with Gas[il's indices. We
chose to exclude from our data political events that challenged and perhaps threatened to
change a government but did not do so - strikes, riots, attempted coups, and elections where
the previous governmen~ was reelected. To assess the implications for an institution like the
central bank, it seemed better to focus on institutionally well-defined events that actually
changed the governme~~.t to which the bank reported.
['ha-nees at the cen r . The raw data on instability at the CB consists of the actual
dates of changes of thr CEOs of the central banks in over sixty countries between 1950 and
1989. CB govemors' :urnover is only an imperfect indicator of 1~31 CB independence in
developing countries ( t or more discussion of this proxy, see Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti,
1992; chapter 19 of C:kierman, 1992; Cukiermart, Kalaitzidakis, Summers and Webb,
1993). Low turnover ::ces not always imply a high level of CB independence - a relatively
subservient governor ~:~ay stay in office longer precisely because he does not stand up to the
executive branch. T' . ~ may be true for countries with exceptionally low turnover rates such
as Iceland, Denmark ~ritain and the U.S. In such countries tumover is probably unrelated
to independence. O: :ie other hand, it is very likely that above some critical ttunover rate,
CB independence is :.~wer the higher the turnover rate of the governor. One reason is that
for sufficiently high r.~rnover rates the tenure of the CB govemor is shorter than that of the
execudve branch. Tt:is makes the governor more suscepuble to influence by the execu6ve
branch and more dis~-~uraged from trying to implement longer-term policies. Since in most
countries the elector;~: cycle is at least four years, it is likely that the threshold turnover issomewhere be[ween 0.2 and 0.25 (average tenure of four to five years). In addition, for
very short terms of office, such as three years or less, it is generally more difficult to
implement long term policies (such as the maintenance of price stability) for any electoral
cycle. One limitation of the tumover variable is that all the industrial countries have
tumover rates at or below the criácal rated in the period we examine, whereas turnover rates
in developing countries span a range that gces well above the criácal point.
The measures of poliácal influence on the CB developed here do not rely on tumover
alone. They also capture the degree of poliácal influence by examining the links between
poliácal instability and subsequent turnover at the CB. Hence the measures appear to be
appropriate for both industrial and developing economies. They also make it possible to
disánguish between the frequencies of changes at the CB in poliácal periods and in non
poliácal periods. A relaávely high level of the fust frequency indicates substantial influence
of poliácal instability on the CB. A relaávely high level of the second frequency does not
indicate that, but at least beyond some threshold a high non poliácal CB govemors' turnover
most likely indicates that the CB is more dependent.
.~mple c~verage and Droc ~r c. The sample consists of 64 countries with matched
data on poliácal and on CB instability. It includes all the major industrial and developing
countries, but excludes most East Bloc countries.` The data cover 1950-89, where possible,
but start later for countries that achieved poliácal independence or established a central bank
after 1950. The data are divided into two sub periods: 1950-71, corresponding to the
Bretton Woods ere, and 1972-89. In each sub period as well as in the total period, a country
`Appeadix table A2 lists the countries.9
is included only if data are available for at least 10 years. With shorter períods, the data
would quíte likely be unrepresentative.
There are instances where a given CB govemor change occurs within the political span
of two or more previous poli[ical transitions. In such cases the CB change is attributed only
to the most recent political transition.
III. POLITI AL VERSUS NON POLTITCAL CENTRAL BANK INSTABII.TTY -
FiTi T SAMPLE EVIDENCE
To what extent dces political instability translate into instability at the central bank7
Are there systematic differences in central bank tumover between political periods (those
immedia[ely following a political change) and non-political periods? If there are differences,
how dces their magnitude vary with country characteristics? To answer the question this
section measures political instability by the frequency of political transitions, as defined in
the previous section, and instability at the central bank by the turnover of the governors.
Before attempting to give precise answers to these questions it is instructive to take a
broad look at the data. Table 1 presents CB turnover figures (measured as the number of CB
governor changes per unit of time, where time is measured in bi-monthly units) for various
time periods following a political transition, for 64 countries between 1950 and 1989. Thus,
the overall frequency of govemors' changes within the same month or one month following a
political transition ís 0.142. The same frequency within two to three months following a
political transition is 0.054 and it is only 0.024 in periods which are located at least ten
months after a political transition. These numbers correspond to average terms of office of10
1.2, 3.1 and 6.9 years respecdvely.'
TABLE 1- FREOUENCIES OF CB GOVERNORS' CHAN E AT VARIO A.
INTERVALS FOLLOWING THE LATEST POLITICAL TRANSITION
- FULL SAMPLE
Lag interval in months 0-1 2-3 4-6 7-9 10 or
more
Frequency 0.142 0.054 0.052 0.028 0.024
(per two months)
The numbers in Table 1 can be interpreted as estimates of the probability of one CB
govemor change conditional on being within a time segment that follows a political transition
by i to if2 (or by i to i~-3) months6 Table 1 reveals that, for the entire sample of
countries, this probability decreases monotonically with the number of months that have
elapsed since the last political transition. It is almost three times larger in time segments that
are zero to one month following a political [ransition than in time segments that are two to
siz months after a political transition. This probability drops further - to about a half of its
value in the 2-6 months time segments - for time periods seven or more months after a
political transition.
Time periods within zero to one months of a political transition are highly likely to be
s I.et x be a turoover numbu from Table 1. Then, tbe carrespooding avcregc tcrm in office, in years,
is yivea by 1ltíx.
6 This interpretatíoa raquires the probsbility of two or more changes withia the subpcriod to be ~gligible.
Since the basic time unit - two months - is short, this essumption is supported by the data.11
political while time periods that are located more than nine months after a political transition
are likely to be non-political. The classification of periods in[o political and non-political for
intermediate lag intervals is murlder. To find the cutoff lag between poli6cal and
non-political periods we assume that periods which aze at least ten months after a political
transition are certainly non-polidcal and compare the estimated probability of a governor
change within that period with the probabilities estimated for shorter lags. We then classify
as political all time periods that are located up to nine months after a polifical transition,
provided that their estímated probabílities of governor changes differ significantly from this
probability in the (non-political) ten-or-more period. Time periods in the 0-9 months lag
range are classified as non-political if the estimated probability does not significantly differ
from that of the ten or more range.
To test for possible differences between the probability of CB governor change in the
ten~r-more lag periods and each of the shorter lag intervals in Table 1, we use the normal
approzimation to the binomial distribution. More specifically let c~ and c,o be the number
of CB governor changes in time interval i following a political transition and in the ten or
more lag range respectively. As in Table 1, i may assume the interval values [0,1], [2,3],
[4,6], [7,9] and 10 or more. We shall denote each of these lag intervals by its lower botmd.
Thus i assumes the values 0, 2, 4, 7 and 10. Let n; be the number of periods within lag
interval i in the sample. The frequency of CB governor changes within lag interval i is
given by
f; - c; I t~ for i- 0,2,4,7,10. (1)12
Let P; be the true conditional probability of a CB governor change in lag interval i
following a political transition. The null hypotheses to be tested are
H,: P; - P,o for i- 0,2,4,7
against each of the alternative hypotheses that P; is significantly larger than Pto.
(2)
The
specification of the alternative hypotheses accommodates the possibility that the probability of
a turnover at the CB is lazger at shorter lags following a political transition. Under each of
the null hypotheses the values
fi-f10
zi - , i - 0,2,4,7




- ci ~- c10
fi - n i- n ' i- 0,2,4,7 (3b)
t 10
have approximately a standard norntal distribudon, provided both n; and n1e are larger
than 30.' (See, for example Huntsberger, Croft and Billingsley (1980), p.302). The null
hypotheses should be accepted for small values of the zi's and rejected for large positive
z;'s. Table 2 displays these statistics. Since a z; of 3 implies that the null is rejected at the
0.001 level we oonclude that the probabilities of a tutnover at the CB are significantly larger
for the 0-1, 2-3, 4-ólag periods than for the 10-plus lag periods. However, there is no
significant difference in the probability of a CB governor change between the 7-91ag period
and the 10-plus lag period. The evidence in Table 2 therefore supports the conclusion that
' 7'hese conditions are always satisfiod for tóe eatire sample of countries. For i- 0,2, q and o1e are
tàe numbers of two months periods in the appropriate intcrvals. For i s 4,7 they refer to the number of three
monthly periods. This variation in tóe leagth of the basic time unit is introduced to malce its leagth ideatica! to the
length of táe time period within each lag interval (2 months for i a 0,2 and 3 months for i Q 4,7)). In either
case the value of n is sufficiently large to make the normal approximation to the binomia! valid.13
the cutoff between political and non political periods occurs at a lag of siz months following
a political transition. Accordingly we define periods of up to siz months following a politiral
transition as political and periods which are loca[ed seven or more months after the latest
political transition as non-political. The respective frequencies are 0.040 and 0.012
respectively. The z statistic testing the significance of the difference between these two
estimated probabilities is a huge 12.2.
TABLE 2: VALUES OF THE TEST STATISTIC FOR THE NULL
H,; P~ - pio - FULL SAMPLE
Lag Intervai (months) 0-1 2-3 4-6 7-9
z; 15.3 4.1 4.5 0.6
In summary, for the entire sample of countries the evidence supports the view that
instability at the CB rises in periods following political transitions and that this increase is
significant. Furthermore the most likely cutoff between political periods, with a relatively
high probability of a change in governor, and non political periods with a lower probability
is siz months following the latest political transition. Finally, the estimated probability of a
change at the CB is more than 3 times larger in periods that have beEn identified as political
than in periods that have been identified as non politícal. These results taken together
suggest that the chief ezecutive officers of central banks are, on average, more likely to be
replaced after political transitions than in other periods. Thus, political instability increases
instability at the centrel bank and weakens its independence from polidcal authorities.
IV. POLTI7CAL VERSUS NON-POLITICAI~ CF.NTRAL BANK INSTABILTfY BY14
BROAD COUNTRYSUBGROUPS
This section ezamines how the profile of estima[ed probabilities of a change at the CB
varies between industrial and developing countries. Within each of these groups, countries
are disaggregated further by type of regime: countries with democracy the whole time,
countries with authoritarian regimes the whole time, and countries alterna6ng between a
democratic and an authoritarian regime (mized regime). Most industrial countries are
democratic for the whole time. There are no authoritarian-only countries within this group
during the period under investigation, and only two (Spain and France) who belong to the
mized-regime group. Developing countries include all three subgroups -- democratic-only,
authoritarian-0nly, and mized.
Table 3 presents the esdmated probabilities of CB governor changes at various lags
following a political transition for the different subgroups of countries. We first focus on the
profiles of estimated probabilities of industrial and developing countries. These probabilities
are higher in developing coun[ries than in industrial countries at all lags following a political
transition. The frequencies decline monotonically for developing countries but have two
peaks for industrial countries -- one in the initial 0-1 interval and a second lower peak in the
4-6 month interval. A replication of the tests of the previous section for each group
separately reveals that for developing countries the appropriate cutoff between political and
non political periods is still at the upper end of the 4-6 months interval. The z statistics for
testing the null hypotheses P; - P,p for i- 0,2,4,7 are 15.5, 4.9, 4.4 and 1.4
respectively. The z statistic of the null that the frrquency within the entire 0-6 months
interval is no different than this frequency in periods that are seven or more months after a15
political transition is a huge 12.4. Thus there is clear evidence of a link-running from
political instability to instability at the CB, as well as an estimate of the cutoff between
political and non political periods in developing countries.
ARi F 7 FuFnrrFrrrrES OF CB GOVERNOR CHANGES AT VARIC
T~~RVALS BY SUBGROUPS OF COUNTRIFS'
Country No.of ~-~ of mont-hs ~inc? a no!itical transi6on
Group countries 4-1 2-3 4-6 7-9 10 or more
Industrial:
All 19 0.058 0.015 0.028 0.008 0.014
Democ. only 17 0.049 0.017 0.031 0.004 0.014
Mized 2 0.130 0.000 0.000 0.059 0.019
Developing:
,r~l 45 0.205 0.083 0.070 0.043 0.030
Democ. only 8 0.122 0.000 0.139 0.000 0.011
Author. only 21 0.196 0.037 0.013 0.053 0.024
Mized 16 0.218 0.108 0.078 0.046 0.029
The evidence is less dramadc for industríal countries but sdll supports the view that in
those countries the probability of a change at the CB in the 0-1 month interval is significantly
higher than in the ten-plus interval. Although there is no significant difference between the
frequencies in the 2-3 month interval and in the ten-plus interval within the group of
industrial countries, the difference in frequencies between the next, 4-6 interval, and the ten
plus interval is significant at roughly the 0.03 level. However, there is no significant
difference in frequencies between the ten-plus interval and the 7-9 month interval. Thus for
industrial economies we could locate the cutoff between political and non political periods
either after the 0-1 interval or after the 4-6 interval. In the first case the z statistic is 4.9and ín the second 3.75 (both significant at the 0.001 level).' To maintain compatibility with
developing countries, most of the subsequent discussion uses the six-month cutoff.
The frexluencies of CB turnover within the three subgroups of developing countries is
summarized in the lower part of Table 3. In all three, the frequencies in the 0-1 month
interval are substantially higher than in the subsequent intervals. Statistical tests reveal that
in all three cases the difference in frequencies between the 0-1 month interval and the 10-plus
interval is significant. Comparing the three subgroups, the average frequency of CB
instability in the 0-1 month interval is highest on average in the countries with mixed
regimes, sewnd highest in authoritarian-only countries, and lowest in democratic-only
developing countries.'
The tendency of mixed regimes to have higher frequencies than democtacies in the al
range also appears within the industrial countries, although this fmding is based on a sample
of only two mixed industrial countries, Spain and France. Also, as was the case for
industrial democracies, there is a second peak in the 4-6 month interval for democratic-only
developing countries.
Appendix Table A1 presents the frequencies of CB turnover for individual countries for
both political periods (up to 6 month following a political change) and non-political periods.
Countries are classified into the same subgroups as in Table 3. Within each subgroup they
are arranged in ascending order of the frequency of polidcal CB governor changes. The
' The resulte ue qualitatively similaz when the same tests are repeated for the democraticonly industrial
countries and for the 41 month time iaterval.
9 But the corresponding froquency in the group of industrial democraciea is evea smaller.17
basic time unit in the table is six months. Thus, a number such as 0.428 for Sweden means
that the average probability of a CB governor change in a political six-month period is 0.428.
The same probability in non-political periods is about one-eighth as large - a mcre 0.053.
The ranges of estimated probabilities for political periods start at zero in all subgroups. But
the upper bounds of the ranges differ. They are 0.43 for industrial democracies, 0.52 for
authoritarian developíng countríes, 0.855 for democratic developing countries and over 1 in
the group of developing countries with mixed regimes.'o As noted before, these ratios
indicate gmss political interference with the CB but do not capture more subtle influences.
A full discussion of the implications of differences in gross political interference follows the
development of a more sophisticated indicator.
V. A MEASLiRE OF THE POLITICAL VLii NERABII.TTY OF CENCRAL BANKS
The fn~uency of CB turnover in political periods reflects both the frequency of
political change and the fraction of political changes that are followed by central bank
changes. In fact, it is the product of these two numbers. While the frequency contains
useful information, but is also useful to measure the vulnerability of central banks in a way
that nets out the effect of the number of polítical changes. The indicator of the political
wlnerability of the CB is defined for each country as the fraction of political transitions that
are followed promptly by a replacement of the CB governor:
'o Tbe teported freqnwcy can be interpreted u aa eatimate of the probability of change, subject to tbe
qualification that there is not tnore than one change in any six-months period. ibisqualification is satisfied for most
countries ~nd tin~e periods. The actual fraqueacy of CB governor change in political periods is luger thsn one per
6 months in only one country. Argentina.18
Number of CB governor changes with i
V(i) ~ months following a Dolitical transition , i- 1,6.
Number of political transitions
Table 4 reports average values of the index of CB poli6cal vulnerability for industrial
and for less developed countries as well as for democratic, authoritarian and mixed regimes
within each group. The overall average value of vulnerability is 0.24, i.e., a little less than
a quarter of all political transitions are followed by a replacement of the CB governor within
6 months. As with the frequency of tumover, the wlnerability varies widely across country
groups and subgroups. Political wlnerability is over three times larger in developing
countries than in industrial countries. A similar picture (not shown) emerges when the
sample is broken into two subperiods (50-71 and 72-89). Central banks of developing
countries with mixed regimes are the most vulnerable.TAB E 4~ POLIT'ICAL VULNERABILTTY OF CENTRAL BANKS BY
C'OtJNTRY GROUPS. 1950-1989
Country Group Vulnerability Frequency of Political
Within 6 months Within 1 month change (per annum)
All 0.24 0.13 0.26
Industrial 0.10 0.05 0.31
Developing 0.34 0.19 0.24
Industrial:
Democratic only 0.10 0.05 0.30
Mued 0.12 .12 0.33
Developing:
Authoritarian only 0.22 0.18 0.15
Democratic only 0.28 0.10 0.17
Mixed 0.38 0.20 0.31
1'he last column of Table 4 reports the average frequency of political transitions per
annum for each country group. Industrial countries have more frequent political transitions
than developing countries, because they have much more frequent democratic changes of
government, with and without party changes. Within developing countries, the subgroup
with mixed regimes has a frequency of political transitions that is about twice that of either
democratic only and authoritarian only counUies. The latter two have less frequent political
changes of any type.
How is the political wlnerability of the CB affected by the type of political instability in
a country? To answer this question we regressed the indices of CB wlnerability at 0-1
month and 0-6 month lags on various types of political transitions and on an dummy forzo
developing countries and a dummy for purely authoritarian regimes." Table 5 summarizes
the results. For the 0-6 months index of vulnerability, the developing-country dummy has a
significant positive impact on CB wlnerability, and high-level political instability also
dces." These effects show up more weakly with the vulnerability index for the 0-1 month
interval.
The wlnerability of central banks to political influence depends on the type of poli6cal
transition. Table 6 reports the indices of political wlnerability by type of political transition
for different country groupings. The fraction 0.61 at the intet~section of the developing
countries row with the "high level' column means that sixty one percent of high level
political transitions in developing countries are followed, within six months, by a
replacement of the CB governor. The numbers in the other cells are defined in a similar
manner." There is generally little difference between the wlnetability to middle level and
to low level political transitions, within each country group. The wlnerability to middle and
low level political ttansitions is more than twice as high in developing countries than in
industrial countries. Furthermore this difference seems to be due to the difference in the
" The estimated equation is a pooled crou-section time seríes regression in which thero aro two
observadons for each country, one for the 1950-71 period and the other for the 1972-89 period.
t~ 7be regres4ion with lhe index of wlnenability for a 0-l monW lag gave qualitatively similar results but
wiW less statistical significance. Since, u least for developing countries, V(6) is a more appropriate meuure of
wlnerability than V(l), thc better fitting regression is also more relevant. The effect of high level political
instability is statistically significan[ if Switrerland 'u omitted from the sample, which would be reasonable on
grounds that the annual change of head of governmeat from the rcpresentative of one canton to the next dcxs nid
reflect a political change in the sense it would elsewhere.
u Some of the cells are empty because, by definition, not all types of political transitiom occur in all
couatry groups. For example, in always democntic countries there are no higó level and authoritarian typc 2
political transitions, by defurition.level of development, rather than to differences in regimes, because vulnerability of
democratic developing countries to middle and low tevel political transitions is more than
twice as large as that of industrial democracies. The vulnerability of mized developing
countries to these types of political transitions is of the same order of magnitude as the
wlnerability in democratic developing countries.Z"L
TABLE 5: CENTRAL BANK VULNERABILITY AND POLTTICAL CHANGE,
1950-89
Ezplanatory Dependent Variable - Vulnerability
Variable
0-1 month lag 0-6 month lag
Constant 0.095 0.150
(1.62) (2.00)"
High level 0.72 1.23




Political change (-0.94) (-0.89)
Low level -0.10 -0.16










' means significant at 10 percent level
" means significant at 5 percent level
"' means significant at 1 percent level.23
TABLE 6: CENTRAL BANK ViJLNERABILTTY (WITHIN 6 MONTHS)
BY TYPE OF POLITICAL TRANSITION AND COUNTRY GROUP
Country group Type of Political Transition'
High Level Authoritarian-2 Middle Level Low Level
Industrial 0.00 NA 0.10 0.11
Developing 0.61 0.46 0.25 0.26
Industrial:
Democratic NA NA 0.10 0.10
Mized 0.00 NA 0.12 0.17
Developing:
Authoritarian only NA 0.20 NA 0.23
Democratic only NA NA 0.29 0.27
Mized 0.61 0.56 0.24 0.28
NA - not applicable, because there were no transitions of that type for that category of
country.
' The definitions of type of political transitions are:
1) High level - change of regime, from democratic to authoritarian or vice versa,
2) Authoritarian 2- replacement of one authoritarian regime by another one,
3) Middle level - change of party without a change in regime,
4) Low level - change of head of government without change in regime or party.
Within developing countries, CB vulnerability to authoritarian-2 transitions is larger
than vulnerability to middle and low level transitions by a factor of almost two. The 0.46
figure for vulnerability to authoritarian-2 transitions masks quite different tendencies in
authoritarian and in mized developing countries. While wlnerability is only 0.2 in the first
group, it is 0.56 in the second. The highest level of CB vulnerability occurs in the face of
high level political transitions within developing countries with mized regimes.
Table A2 in the appendiz presents the vulnerability of central banks to all types of24
political transitions for individual countries by subgroups. Within each subgroup central
banks are arranged in descending order of their political vulnerability. By this measure
Sweden has the most politically vulnerable CB among industrial democracies. Among
democratic-only developing countries, the CB of Botswana is the most vulnerable, and
among developing countries with mixed regimes the Argentine CB is the most vulnerable.
VI. EFFECTS OF CB VULNERABILTTY AND OF NON POLTTI AL TRNO R
ON THE ECONOMY
Besides being of independent interest, behavioral measures of CB autonomy are useful
for testing the effect of this autonomy, or its absence, on the economy. Such a project is
largely beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, this and the next section briefly report
evidence on the relation between some of our measures and the performance of the economy
as reflected by inflation, real growth, and real interest rates.
Fach of these variables is regressed in pooled cross-section time series on CB
wlnerability, on non-political tumover, and on other contro! variables. Non-political
turnover is measured as the average number of non political govemor changes (more than six
months after the latest political transition) per annum.
Inflation. Previous work has established the ezistence of a significant positive
relationship between the rate of depreciation in the real value of money (D) and the (total)
turnover of CB governors for developing countries (Table 7 of Cukierman, Webb and
Neyapti (1992) and Table 20.2 in Cukierman (1992))." Table 7 here extends the effort by
t~ D a rl(1 tr), where r is the mnual iaflation rate.relating D and its standard deviation to the index of wlnerability, non-political turnover,
various types of political instability and three dummies: one for the Bretton-Woods era, one
for having only authoritarian regimes in the period, and one for developing countries.'s
This formulation makes it possible to evaluate whether political instability leads to intlation
only by reducing CB autonomy or also directly. The first regression in Table 7 backs the
view that both channels are important.
's ihe sample consisls of two observationa oa each country. Oue for Ihe 1950-71 period, correspoodmQ
to the flretton Woods en, md the othec for the 1972-89 period.26
TARi.F. 7c iNFLATION AND INSTABILITY AT THE CENTRAL BANK
AND POLITICS. 1950 - 89
Ezplanatory Variable Dependent Variable
Inflation Standard Deviation




(lag 0-6 months) (2.62)"' (3.68)"'
Non-Politícal Turnover 0.26 0.13
(lag over 6 months) (2.65)"' (2.52)"
High level 0.36 0.29




Political change (0.60) (0.225)
Low-level 0.14 0.047
Political change (1.73)' (1.07)
Dummy 0.034 0.027
Authoritarian only (1.08) (1.66)'
Dummy first period -0.082 -0.016
(1950-71) (-4.11)"' (-1.56)
Dummy Developing -0.013 -0.009
(-0.43) -(0.59)
Number of observations 104 ]04
R-square Adjusted. 0.333 U.358
T-statistics in parentheses
' means significant at 10 percent level or lower
" means significant at 5 percent level
"' means significant at 1 percent level.In particular the political wlnerability of the CB as well as non political turnover at the bank
have a positive and significant impact on infladon (D). Political instability, particularly of
the high levels, contribute to increased inflation, as expected, although not as much as the
CB variables. Also, world-wide infla6on is lower during the Bretton-Woods period, even
after allowing for the effect of other variables. This is consistent with the view that fixed
ezchange rates have a stronger disciplining effect on policy than flexible rates. But it may
also be due to the larger shacks that affected the world economy in the post Bretton-Woods
period.
The most important result in Table 7 is the insignificance of the dummy variable for
developing countries. Inflation is higher on average in developing countries, and this could
not be accounted for by just looking at the overall frequency of turnover at the central bank
(Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti 1992). Once turnover is disaggregated into its constituent
parts, however, and account is taken of the different types of political instability, the
distinction between developing and industrial countries no longer contributes to explaining
differences in inflation outcomes. In other words, the differences in vulnerability of the
central bank to political instability, in CB turnover in non-polidcal periods, and in political
instability can fully account for the developing countries having higher average infladon than
industrial countries. Similarly, having an authoritarian regime throughout does not help
significantly to explain differences in average inflation, once the central bank and political
variables are taken into account.
The variability of inflation, measured by the standard deviation of D, is also positively
and significantly related to CB wlnerability and to non-political turnover. The frequency ofzn
high-level polítical change also had a positive and significant effect on the standard deviation
of D.
Growth. Recent empirital literature on growth has identified a number of variables
such as initial GDP and education that are significandy related to real growth (see Barro
(1991) for example). Dces the degree of and-inflation commitment by the monetary
authorities, for which ow indices of CB autonomy are a proxy, have any significant impact
on growth after controlling for these variables? Table 8 answers this question by presenting
growth equations that take account of initial GDP, initial primary and secondary educaGon
etunllment ratios, a decade by decade change in terms of trade, as well as our indices of CB
autonomy.1ó With a full sample of countries, neither of the central bank variables is
significant. Brazil, Korea, and Botswana are outliers, however, because they achieved high
growth despite high rats of central bank turnover indicators of vulnerability. With those
countries excluded, both indicators of political influence on the central bank have a negative
coefficients in the growth regression." This finding supports the view that, other things
being equal, higher politit~l dependence of the CB retards growth. It is possible that
political vulnerability of the CB is a proxy for general economic and political instability, both
of which deter growth possibly by slowing down investment and irutovation.
ta ~e sample consists of, at most, thtae docade observations on each country.
t~ Botswana could be legitimately be discardad from the sample, because it growth was primarily due to
the discovery of diamonds, aot to good macroocoaomic policy. Brazil ad Korea saem tobe simply countries where
lack of ceatral badt autoaomy was not a hinderance to growth, at least not in the period covered here.29
TART F R- GROWTH EOUATIONS WITH CENTRAL BANK VULNERABILITY AND
NON POLI'TICAL TUILNOVER: 1960-1988
Ful] Samole SamDle minus Three'
Constant -.15 0.73 .
(-.15) (0.77)
Initial GDP -.22 -0.25
(-2.46)" (-2.83)"'
Change in Terms of Trade 28.9 28.1
(4. 87)"' (5.01)"'
Initial primary education 2.03 2.53
enrollment ratio (1.98)" (2.55)"'
Initial secondary education 1.59 1.34
enrollment ratio (1.22) (1.04)
Non-politícalturnover 5.80 -2.39
of CB governors (1.80)' (-0.66)
Political wlnerability -.78 -1.51
of CB (-1.15) (-2.30)"
Dummy for the sixties 1.69 1.42
(3 O1)'.' (2.61)."
Dummy for the seventies 1.39 1.11
(2.74)r'" (2.26)"
Adj. R' 0.23
Number of observations 129
0.26
120
Pooled cross section-time series (decades). CB wlnerability is characterized in terms of CB
govemor changes that occur within six months of a political ttansition. t statistics are in
parentheses under the coefficients.
' Botswana, Brazil, and Korea, are excluded.
' designates significance at the 0.10 level
" designates significance at the 0.05 level.
" designates significance at the 0.01 level.iU
There is also some evidence that in developing countries, higher CB wlnerability is associated
with lower levels of investment (Cukierman, Kalaitzidakis, Summers and Webb, 1993). Sorting
out the channels through which political wlnerability affects growth clearly deserves further
work.
Real deoosit interest rates. Previous evidence (Alesina and Summers (1993) and
Cukierman, Kalaitzidakis, Summers and Webb (1993)) suggests there is a negative relation
between the variability of ex-post real interest rates and CB independence. In this work CB
independence is prozied by legal independence for developed countries and CB governon'
turnover for developing countries. We now reexamine this finding with CB wlnerability and
non-political tumover as prozies for lack of CB independence. The second column of Table 9
presents the result. It appears that both CB wlnerability and non-political turnover significantly
increase the yariabilitv of ex-post real deposit rates. This further supports and amplifies the
conclusion that the variability of ex-post real deposit rates is lower in countries with more
independent central banks. Although it has the expected negative sign, the coefficient on legal
independence is not significant.
The first column in Table 9 relates the average level of the ex-post real deposit rate to
measures of CB independence. The higher the political wlnerability of the CB the lower the
average real deposit rate, which corroborates a similar finding in Cukierman, Kalaitudalás,
Summers and Webb (1993). It probably reflects the higher implicit taxation of financial savings
in countries with more politically dependent central banks.31
TABLE 9: THE EX-POST REAL DEPOSIT RATE
AND ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF CENTRAL BANK AUTONOMY
Explanatory Variable Dependent Variable
Constant
Real Ex-Post Standard Deviation




(lag 0-6 months) (-1.89)' (2.1)"
Non Political turnover -1.98 36.24
(lag over 6 months) (-.15) (3.0)"'






T-Statis[ics are in parentheses under the coefficients.
' means significant at 10 percent level
" means significant at 5 percent level
"' means signi6cant at the 1 percent level.
The ex-post real deposit rate is from Easterly, Rodriguez and Schmidt-Hebbel (1992).
Details on the construction of legal independence appear in Culderman, Webb and Neyapti
(1992) and in chapter 19 of Culáerman (1992).32
VIII. THE MEAN AND THE STANDARi) DEVIATION OF iNFLATION AND TH iR C4l~MON ASSOCIATION TO VLTT NFRaurr rry ANp NON POLITi(' rRNnvFrr .....
The strong cross country association between the mean and the variability of inflation is
a well-lrnown empirical regularity. Using legal independence and (total) CB governors'
turnover as prozies for CB independence, up to a quarter of this association is accounted for
by their common association with CB independence (Cukierman 1992, chapten 18 and 22).
For this paper, the same experiment was repeated with CB vulnerability and non political
turnover as (alternative) indices of CB autonomy. In addition, legal independence was added
as a regressor in industrial countries.'" To calculate the fractíon of the correlation between
the mean and the standard deviation of inflation that is due to their common assceiation wi[h
central bank independence we proceeded as follows. First the cross sectional covaríance
between D(the rate of depreciation in the real value of money) and its standard deviation
was calculated. Second, both D and its standard deviation were regressed on CB
wlnerability, non-political turnover and (for industrial countries) legal independence, and the
predicted values of D and of its standard deviation were calculated. Third, the covariance
between those predicted values was calculated and compared to the overall covariance
between D and its standard deviation.
The experiment was done for the entire 1950-89 period and for the subperiods 1950-71
and 1972-89. The fractions of the covariability between D and its standard deviation due to
their mutual línJc to CB independence are: 0.30 for the whole period and 0.40 and 0.31 for
~~ For details on the construction of the iadex of IegaJ indepeadence see C~lciarman (I992) ciupter r9 or LLkiarwan. Webb and Neyapti (1992).33
the two sub-periods. Thus, with the more refined measures of CB autonomy presented in
this paper, about one third of the association between inFlation and its variability is due to
the'u common associatíon with CB independence.
VIII. ('ONCLtTi~ING REMARKS
Stability and other characteristics of government institutions have always been
recognized in economic hístory and in country studies as crucial determinants of
macroeconomic stability. Recently this recognition has spread to theoretical work on
macroeconomics and has been the focus of some cross-country statistical analysis (Fischer
(1991), Edwards and Tabellini (1991), Cukierman, Edwards, and Tabellini (1992), Alesina,
Ozler, Roubini, and Swagel (1991), Haggard and Kaufman and Webb (1992). A survey
appears in Alesina and Perotti (1993)). As one would expect, political instability is
positively related to inflation and negatively related to growth. There are various theories
for how political instability causes macroeconomic instability, most of them not mutually
exclusive. One contender is that political instability shortens time horizons of policy makers
and that it decreases the ability of the political system to efficiently resolve disputes over real
incomes.
This paper has demonstrated that political instability causes instability at the CB as well.
But the spillover from political instability to instability at the CB varies across country
groups and types of political transitions. It is particularly large when the regime changes
from democratic to authoritarian or vice versa. This supports the view that when political
change is deep enough to involve fundamental rules of the game and in other circumstances34
where political change would probably mean the party in power would not be back soon, if
ever, then the ezpected effect of greater political instability would be shortened time
horizons, as discussed above, and therefore less autonomy and stability for the central bank.
Each new govemment would want to use the central bank to try to stay in power as long as
possible, and would have little concern for the associated detrimental longer run effects.
Greater ft~equency of low- and medium-level political change, however, -- just changing the
head of government or the party - dces not on average lead to reduced central bank
autonomy as proxied by its political vulnerability."
An important issue for future work is the possibility of reverse causality between the
performance of the economy and our measures of gross political influence on the CB. The
largely cross-sectional nature of our data precludes the use of Granger-Sims and other
methods to test the exogeneity of our measures of political instability with respect to the
performance of the ewnomy. Hence, strictly speaking, it is possible that some of the
significant relationships between these two groups of variables are due to causality running
from the economy to political influence.m
The measure of CB vulnerability, however, is more likely to be exogenous with respect
to the economy than other behavioral indices of polidcal influence on the CB. Even if
19 Actually in democratic governments whero the party changes frequently, the ruling party might typically
lack tbe strength to impoae its will unilaterally and might thus agree to a compromise that would endum cbanges
of party. 7bis was explicit in the set-up of the reformed Chi)esn central bank in 1989 (Arriagada aad Graham
(1993)). An enalysis ofthe effect ofpolitical instability on CB indepeadeoce ia countries with democratic aad stable
rules of the political process appears in Cukierman (1994).
p This is probably lesa likely to be the case for real interest ntes tLan (or real growth. Thero is evidenco
that real growth is affected by political instability (Barro (1991), Alesina, OzJer, Roubini and Swagel (1991)) which
msy, in turn, cause instability at the CB.35
poliácal instability responds to the performance of the economy, vulnerability as defined here
focuses on the ratio between instability at the CB and poliácal instability. This raáo, which
depenàs on insátuáons and socio-poliácal norms, may be lazgely exogenous to the economic
performance.
Since the main novelty of this paper is in the extracáon of empirical regulariáes by
matching two new data sets our approach has been inducáve rather than deductive. We
deliberately avoided committing to and tesáng a particular model since we believe that at this
euly stage the broad regulariáes in the data can be uncovered more efficienUy without
posiáng a parácular model. Our hope is that the regulariáes uncovered here will encourage
the construcáon of more precise models and further empirical tesáng of hypotheses.36
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APPENDIX TABLE A1
Frequencies of Political and non Political Central Bank Governor
Changes -- Individual Countries by Subgroups, 1950-1989 (')
(1) (2)




United Kingdom 0.000 0.057






































Western Samoa 0.429 0.240
























(y) The frequencies are measured in terms of time units that are six months long.
NA - Not available.40
APPENDIX TABLE A2
Polítical Vulnerability of Central Banks for Individuai
Countries by Subgroups, 1950-1989 (')












































































(~) Within each subgroup central banks are arranged in descending order of
political vulnerability.
NA - Not available.Discussion Paper Series, CentER, Tilburg University, The Netherlands:
(For prcvious papers please consult prcvious discussion papcrs.)
No. Author(s)
941 I N. Uagan. R. Serrano
and O. Volij
9412 H. Bestcr and
E. Petrakis




9416 J.J.G. Lemmen and
S.C.W. Eijffinger
9417 J. de la Horra and
C. Fernandez
9418 D. Talman and 'L. Yang
9419 H.J. Biercns
9420 G. van der Laan,
D. Tahnan and 7.. Yang
9421 R. van den Brink and
R.P. Gilles
9422 A. van Soest
9423 N. Dagan and O. Volij
9424 R. van dcn Brink and
P. Bonn
942~ P.H.M. Ruys and
R.P. Gillcs
942G T. Callan and
A. van Socst
9427 R.M.N'.J. Bcctsma
and P. van dcr Plocg
q.1~K LP ('. Klcijncn :md
W. ~ un l in,rnrndaal
Titlc
A Non-cooperative View of Consistent Bankruptcy Rules
Coupons and Oligopolistic Price Discrimination
Bayesian Efficiency Analysis with a Flexible Fortn: The AIM
Cost Function
World Bank-Bortower Relations and Project Supervision
A Bargaining Model of Financial Intermediation
The Price Approach to Financial Integration: Decomposing
European Money Market Interesi Rate Differentials
Sensitivity to Prior Independence via Farlie-Gumbel
-Morgenstern Model
A Simplicial Algori[hm for Computing Proper Nash Equilibria
of Finite Games
Nonparametric Cointegration Tests
Intersection Theorems on Polytopes
Ranking the Nodes in Directed and Weighted Directed Graphs
Youth Minimum Wage Rates: The Dutch Experience
Bilateral Comparisons and Consistent Fair Division Rules in the
Context of Bankruptcy Problems
Digraph Competitions and Cooperative Games
The Interdependence between Production and Allocation
Family Labour Supply and Taxes in Ireland
Macroeconomic Slabilisation and Intervention Policy under an
1?xchangc Rate Band
I~~u-stagc vcrsus Scyucnlial Samplc-sire Dctcrmination in
Kcgression An:dyxis of Simulalion lixpcrimcntsNo. nothnrys)
9429 M. I'radhmi and
n. van Soest
9430 P.JJ. Herings
9431 I LA. Kcuzenkamp and
J.R. Magnus
9432 C. Dang, D. 'falman and
'l.. Wang
9433 R. van dcn Brink
~)a3a c'. veld
9435 V. Fcltkamp, S. 'I~ijs and
S. Muto
9436 G.-J. Otten, P. Borm,
[3. Peleg and S. ~'ijs
9437 S. Hurkens
943R 1.-J. I Icrings, D. 'I'alman,
and "L. Yang
9439 I:. Schaling and D. Smyth
9440 J. Arin and V. Feltkamp
9441 P.-J. Jost
9442 J. Bendor, D. Mookherjee,
and D. Ray
94d3 G. van der Laan,
D. Talman and Z. Yang
9444 G.J. Almekinders and
S.C.W. Bijffinger
9445 A. De Waegenaere
9446 L'. Schaling and D. Smyth
9447 G. Koop, J. Osicwalski
and M.F.J. Stccl
"Citlc
Ilouschold [abour Supply in Urhan Arcas of a Dcvcloping
Country
Endogenously Determined Price Rigidities
On Tests and Significance in Economctrics
A Homotopy nppmach to thc Computation of I;conomic
Equilibria on Ihc Unit Simplcx
nn Axiomatiration of lhc Disjunctivc Pcnnission Value fix
Gamcs with a I'ennission Structurc
Warranl Pricing: n Rcvicw of I?mpirical Rc.carch
Bird's Tree Allocations Revisitcd
The MC-value for Monotonic NTU-Games
Learning by Forgetful Players: From Primitive Fonnations to
Persistent Retracts
The Computation of a Continuum of Constrained Equilibria
The Effects of Inflation on Growth and Fluctuations in
Dynamic Macroeconomic Modcls
The Nucleolus and Kernel of Veto-rich Transferable Utilih
Games "
On the Role of Commitment in a Class of Signalling Problems
Aspirations, Adaptive Learning and Cooperation in Repeated
Games
Modelling Cooperati~c (iamcs rn Pumutali~~nal Slruclurc
Accounting for Uaily Bundcsbank and Fcdcral Rcscrvc
Interventíon: A Friction Model with a GnRC~If npplicati„n
Equilibria in Incompletc Financial Markcts with Portfoliu
Constraints and 'fransaction Cutits
fhe Effects of Intlation on Growth and Flucluations in
Dynamic Macrocconomic Modcls
I lospital Ef7icicncy nnalysis l hrnu~,h hrdi~ idrrtl I:Ilccls: n
Baycsian npproachNo. Author(s) 'I'itle
9448 H. Hamers, J. Suijs,
S. Tijs and P. Borm
The Split Core for Sequencing Games
9449 G.-J. Otten, H. Peters,
and O. Volij







9454 F. de Jong, "f. Nijman
and A. Riicll
9455 F. Vella and M. Verbeek
9456 H.A. Keuzcnkmnp aod
M. McAleer
9457 K Chattcrjcc and
B. Dutta
9458 A. van den Nouweland,
B. Peleg and S. "fijs
Two Characterizations of the Uniforrn Rule for Division
Problems with Singlc-Peaked Preferences
Transitional Impacts of Environmental Policy in an Endogenous
Growth Model
Intemational Price Discrimination in the European Car Market
An Econometric Model of Oligopoly Behavior with Product
Differentiation
A Globally and Universally Stable Price Adjustment Process
A Note on the Decentralization of Pareto Optima in Economies
with Public Projects and Nonessential Private Goods
Price Effects of Trading and Components ofthe Bid-ask Spread
on the Paris Bourse
"fwo-Step Estimation of Simultaneous Equation Panel Data
Models with Censored Endogenous Variables
Simplicity, Scientific Inference and Econometric Modelling
Rubinstcin Auctions On Compctition for Bargaining Partners
Axiomatic Characterizations of the Walras Correspondence for
Generalized Economies
9459 T. ten Raa and E.N. Wolff Outsourcing of Services and Productivity Growth in Goods
Industries
94ó0 GJ. Ahnekinders A Positive Theory of Central Bank Intervention
9461 J.P. C'hoi Standardization and Experimentation: Ex Mtc Versus Ex Post
Standardization
9462 J.P. Choi Herd Behavior, the "Penguin Effect", and the Suppression of
Infotmational Diffusion: An Analysis of Informational
Extemalities and Payoff Interdependency
94G3 R.IL Gordon and Why is Capital so Immobile Internationally?: Possible
A.I.. Rovrnherg Explanations and Implications for Capital Income Taxation
q~36~1 [[. v:ui Dammc and Games with Imperfectly Observable Commitment
S. Ilurkcns
9-165 ~1'. (iiith and I?. van Dnnnnc Infimnation, Strategic Behavior and Faimess in Ultimatum
Bargaining - An Experimental Study -No. Author(s)
9466 S.C.W. Eijffinger and
J.J.G. Lemmen
9467 W.B. van den Hout and
J.P.C. Blanc
9468 H. Webers
9469 P.W.J. De Bijl




9473 I.. Meijdam and
M. Vcrhocven
9474 L. Mcijdam and
M. Verlioeven
9475 7.. Yang
9476 II. Hamers, P. Borm,









The Catching Up of European Moncy Markets: The Degrce
Versus the Speed of Integration
The Power-Series Algorithm for Markovian Queueing Networks
The Location Model with Two Periods of Price Competition
Delegation of Responsibility in Organizations
North-South Knowledge Spillovers and Competition.
Convergence Venus Divergence
Trade Dynamics and Endogenous Growth - An Overlapping
Generations Model
Growth, History and Intemational Capital Flows
Comparative Uynamics in Perfect-Foresight Models
Constraints in Perfect-Foresight Models: The Case of Old-Age
Savings and Public Pension
A Simplicial Algorithm for "festing the Integral Property of a
Polytope
The Chinese Postman and Delivery Games
Servicing the Public Debt C'omment
InFlation Versus Tasation: Representative Dcmocracy and Party
Nominations
Intersection Theorems with a Cuntinuum of Intersection Points
Capacitatcd Facilily Lucalion: ticpar:diun Algunlhmti aud
Computational Expcricnce
A Smoothed Ma~imum Score Gstimator for the Binary Choice
Panel Data Model with Individual FiKed Effects and
Application to Labour Force Participation
9482 J. Bouckaert and Phoncbanking
li. Degryse
9483 B. Allen, R. Deneckere, Capacity Precommitment as a Barrier lo I{ntry: A Bcrtrand
f. Faith and D. Kovenock -Edgeworth ApproachNo. Author(s) Title
9484 J.-J. I Icrings, Equilibrium Adjustment of Uiscquilibrium Priccs
G. van der Laan, D. 'falman,
and R. Venniker
9485 V. Bhaskar Informational Constraints and the Overlapping Generations
Model: Folk and Anti-Folk Theorems
9486 K. Aardal, M. Labbé, On the Two-level Uncapacitated Facility Location Problem
1. Leung, and M. Oueyranne
9487 W.B. van den flout and
J.P.C. Blanc







9491 A. Blume, U.V. DeJong,
Y.-Q Kim, and
G.B. Sprinkle
9492 R.-A. Dana, C. Le Van,
and P. Magnicn
9493 S. Eijflinger,
M. van Rooij, and
E. Schaling
9494 S. Eijffinger and
M.van Keulen
949~ li. Iluizinga
9d9b V. Fclikaiup. S. I ijs and
S. Nhni,
iW97 LI'..LI . Schrrpcns
949x n.l.. B~,.-enherg and
K.n. de Mr,oi.i
9499 J. Ashaveri, K. Ilcuti,
A. lanscn and
B. Szczcrba
Adaptive Estimation in Time-Series Models
A Simplicial Algorithm for Testing the Integral Property of
Polytopes: A Revision
Rcal Exchange Rate Misalignment and Redistrihution
Evolution of the Meaning of Messages in Sender-Receiver
Games: An Experiment
General F,quilibrium in Asset Markets with or without Short-
Selling
Central Bank Independence: A Paneldala Approach
Central Bank Independence in Another Eleven Countries
l"he Incidence of Interest Withholding Taxes: Evidence from
thc I.DC Loan Markct
Minimum C'„st Spanning I?xtrnsion Problems: Thc Proportional
Kulc and thc Dcccntralind Rulc
I inancial Intcrmcdiation, liank Failurc and l)17icial Assistancc
l:nvironmental "fax Reform and Endogenous Growth
Inventory Managcment of Repairable Service Parts for Personal
Computers: A Case Study
9410U A. Cukiennan and S. Webb Political InFluence on the Central Bank - Intcmational lividencc~i~a~w~~ï~~iW~~~~~~~~